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Abstrat: Condentiality, integrity and authentiation are more relevant issues in Ad honetworks than in wired xed networks. One way to address these issues is the use of sym-metri key ryptography, relying on a seret key shared by all members of the network.But establishing and maintaining suh a key (also alled the session key) is a non-trivialproblem. We show that Group Key Agreement (GKA) protools are suitable for establish-ing and maintaining suh a session key in these dynami networks. We take an existingGKA protool, whih is robust to onnetivity losses and disuss all the issues for the goodfuntioning of this protool in Ad ho networks. We give implementation details and net-work parameters, whih signiantly redue the omputational burden of using publi keyryptography in suh networks.Key-words: Ad Ho Networks, ryptographi protooles, Die-Hellmann protool
AGDH (Asymetri Group Die Hellman), un protoolede mise en aord de lé eae pour les réseaux Ad HoRésumé : Les problèmes de ondentialité, d'intégrité et d'authentiation sont de plusen plus prévalents dans les réseaux Ad Ho, mais aussi dans les réseaux xes laires. Uneapprohe à es problèmes est d'utiliser la ryptographie symétrique (ou à lé serète),reposant sur une lé partagée par tous les membres du réseau. Mais étblir et maintenirune telle lé, dite de session, est un problème non trivial. Nous montrons que les protoolesde mise en aord de lé de groupe (GKAs : Group Key Agreement protools) sont bienadaptés pour établir et maintenir de telles lés de session dans les réseaux dynamiques.Nous onsidérons un protoole déjà établi, qui est robuste aux pertes de onnetivité, etnous envisageons tous les problèmes relatifs au bon fontionnement de e protoole dansles réseaux Ad Ho. Nous donnons des détails d'implémentation, des paramètres réseaux,e qui permet de réduire onsidérablement la harge alulatoire liée à l'emploi de la lépublique dans de tels réseaux.Mots-lés : Réseaux Ad Ho, protooles ryptographiques, Die-Hellmann protool
AGDH 31 IntrodutionAMobile Ad ho NETwork (MANET) is a olletion of mobile nodes onneted via a wirelessmedium forming an arbitrary topology. Impliit herein is the ability for the network topologyto hange over time as links in the network appear and disappear. To maintain the networkonnetivity, a routing protool must be used. An important seurity issue is that of theintegrity of the network itself. Quite a lot of studies have been already done to resolveseurity issues in existing routing protools (see [HPJ02℄,[PMdS03℄,[ACJ+03b℄,[ACL+05℄).An orthogonal seurity issue is that of maintaining ondentiality and integrity of dataexhanged between nodes in the network. The task of ensuring end-to-end seurity of dataommuniations in MANETs is equivalent to that of seuring end-to-end seurity in tra-ditional wired networks. Many studies have been arried out to solve this problem. Onewidespread solution is to reate a virtual private network (VPN) in a tunnel between thetwo ommuniating nodes. IPSe is a well known seurity arhiteture whih allows suhVPNs to be built between two ommuniating nodes. However this solution requires a dif-ferent seret key for eah end-to-end onnetion. Moreover the VPN solution an simplyhandle uniast tra. An alternative solution is the use of a shared seret key. There aremany issues with suh an approah. First this key must be distributed among the networknodes. Seond, to avoid the ompromising of this key it is required to renew the key often.A solution to these two issues is the use a Group Key Agreement protool, whih relies onthe priniples of the publi key ryptography.A Group Key Agreement protool (GKA) is a key establishment tehnique in whih ashared seret is derived by more than two partiipants as a funtion of information publilyontributed by eah of them. They are espeially well suited to moderate sized groups withno entral authority to distribute keys. An authentiated group key agreement protoolprovides the property of key authentiation (also alled impliit key authentiation), wherebyeah partiipant is assured that no other party besides the partiipants an gain aess to theomputed key. GKA protools are dierent from group key distribution (or key transport)protools wherein one partiipant hooses the group key and ommuniates it to all others.GKA protools help in deriving keys whih are omposed of eah one's ontribution. Thisensures that the resulting key is fresh (for a given session) and is not favorable to onepartiipant in any way. The following seurity goals an be identied for any GKA protool.1) Key Serey: The key an be omputed only by the partiipants.2) Key Independene: Knowledge of any set of group keys does not lead to the knowl-edge of any other group key not in this set (see [BM03℄).3) Forward Serey: Knowledge of some long term seret does not lead to the knowl-edge of past group keys.An important advantage of a group key agreement protool over a simple group keydistribution sheme is the forward serey. This property an be partiularly interestingin situations where some nodes are likely to be ompromised (e.g. in military senarios).
RR n° 5915
4 Adjih et alIn suh senarios, using a GKA, the knowledge of the long term seret of this node doesnot ompromise all past session keys. From a funtional point of view, it is desirable tohave proedures to handle the dynamism in the network. These proedures enable eientmerging or partitioning of two groups in the network.2 Related WorkKey establishment protools for networks an be broadly lassied into three lasses: Keytransport using symmetri ryptography, Key transport using asymmetri ryptography andKey agreement using asymmetri ryptography. In key transport protools, one partiipanthooses the group key and seurely transfers it to other partiipants using a priori sharedserets (symmetri or asymmetri). These protools are not suitable for ad ho networks fortwo reasons; rstly, they require a single trusted authority to distribute keys and seondly,ompromise of the a priori seret of any partiipant breahes the seurity of all past groupkeys, thus failing to provide forward serey. Thus GKA protools are more relevant sinethey provide this forward serey property.Most group key agreement protools are derived from the two-party Die-Hellman keyexhange protool. GKA protools, not based on Die-Hellman, are few and inlude theprotools of Pieprzyk and Li [PL00℄, Tzeng and Tzeng [TT00℄ and Boyd and Nieto [BN03℄.Both protools of Pieprzyk and Li [PL00℄ and Boyd and Nieto [BN03℄ fail to provide forwardserey while the protool of Tzeng and Tzeng [TT00℄ is quite resoure-intensive and proneto ertain attaks [BN03℄. Forward Serey is a very desirable property for key establish-ment protools in ad ho networks, as some nodes an be easily ompromised due to lowphysial seurity of nodes. Thus it is essential that ompromise of one single node does notompromise all past session keys. We summarize and ompare in Table 1 existing GKAprotools based on Die-Hellman protools. We ompare essentially the unauthentiatedversions of the protools, as most ahieve authentiation by using digital signatures in a verysimilar manner and thus have similar added osts for ahieving authentiation. We omparethe eieny of these protools based on the following parameters: Number of synhronous rounds: In a single synhronous round, multiple inde-pendent messages an be sent in the network. The total time required to run a round-eient GKA protool an be muh less than other GKA protools that have the samenumber of total messages but more rounds. This is beause the nodes spend less timewaiting for other messages before sending their own. Number of messages: This is the total number of messages (uniast or broadast)exhanged in the network to derive the group key. For multiple hop ad ho networks,the distintion between uniast and broadast messages is important as the latter anbe muh more energy onsuming (for the whole network) than the former. Number of exponentiations: All Die-Hellman based GKA protools require anumber of modular exponentiations to be performed by eah partiipant. RelativeINRIA
AGDH 5Expo per Ui Messages Broadasts RoundsITW [ITW82℄ m m(m− 1) 0 m− 1GDH.1 [STW96℄ i + 1 2(m− 1) 0 2(m− 1)GDH.2 [STW96, BCP02℄ i + 1 m− 1 1 mGDH.3 [STW96℄ 3 2m− 3 2 m + 1Perrig [Per99℄ log2 m + 1 m m− 2 log2 mDutta [DB05℄ log3 m m m log3 mTable 1: Comparison of non onstant rounds GKA protoolsExpo per Ui Messages Broadasts Rounds Struture FSOtopus [BW98℄ 4 3m− 4 0 4 Hyperube YesBDB [BD94, KY03℄ 3 2m m 2 Ring YesBCEP [BCEP03℄ 2† 2m 0 2 None NoCatalano [BC04℄ m + 1 2m 0 2 None YesKLL [KSML04℄ 3 2m 2m 2 Ring YesNKYW [NLKW04℄ 2‡ m 1 2 None YesSTR [SSDW88, KPT04℄ (m− i)∗ m 1 2 Skewed tree YesOurs (AGDH) 2∗∗ m 1 2 None Yes
†: m exponentiations for the base station.
‡: m + 1 exponentiations and m-1 inverse alulations for the parent node.
∗: Up to 2m exponentiations for the sponsor node.
∗∗: m exponentiations for the leader.Table 2: Comparison of onstant round GKA protoolsto all ryptographi operations, a modular operation is the most omputationallyintensive operation and thus gives a good indiation of the omputational ost foreah node.Communiation osts still remain the ritial fator for hoosing energy-eient protoolsfor most ad ho networks. A modular exponentiation (whih is most eiently done usingellipti urve ryptography) an be performed in a few tens of milliseonds on most palmtops,whereas message propagation in multi-hop ad ho networks an be easily of the order of fewseonds and has energy impliations for multiple nodes in the network. As an be seenin Table 1, most existing GKA protools require O(m) rounds of ommuniation for mpartiipants in the protool. Suh protools do not sale well in ad ho networks. Eventree-based GKA protools with O(log m) rounds an be quite demanding for medium tolarge sized ad ho networks. Therefore onstant-round protools are better suited for adho networks.
RR n° 5915
6 Adjih et alAmong the onstant round protools (see Table 2), Otopus [BW98℄, BDB [KY03℄ andKLL [KSML04℄ require speial ordering of the partiipants. This results in messages sentby some partiipant being dependent on that of others. In suh a ase, failure of a singlenode an often halt the protool. Thus suh protools are not robust enough to adaptwell to the dynamism of ad ho networks. The BCEP protool [BCEP03℄ involves a basestation, and fails to provide forward serey if the long-term seret of the base station isrevealed. The Bresson and Catalano protool [BC04℄ is omputationally demanding with
O(m) exponentiations for eah partiipant. Another drawbak is that if any partiipant'smessage is lost in rst round, the whole protool is brought to a halt, as the seret sharingshemes implies all m ontributions are required to ompute the key. Thus only the protoolsNKYW and STR (desribed below in details) seem to be usable in MANETs.NKYW[NLKW04℄: The original paper proposes this protool for ad ho networks om-posed of devies with unequal omputational powers. In the rst round, eah partiipant
Mi uniasts its ontribution gri , i ∈ [1, n − 1] to a xed node Mn, alled the parent node.The parent node hooses random r and rn and omputes w = gr, xn = grrn and xi = (gri)rfor eah reeived gri . It broadasts w and {xn ∗ Πj 6=ixj}i. The key is derived from Πixi.The protool remains a bit expensive omputationally ompared to the protool that willbe desribed in this paper.STR[SSDW88, KPT04℄: This protool was proposed by Steer et al. in [SSDW88℄ forstati groups. Perrig et al. proposed proedures to handle group hanges in [KPT04℄.Although this protool has not been ited as a onstant round protool till now, we explainhere in details why this protool is indeed a onstant round protool. In the rst round,eah partiipant Mi broadasts its ontribution gri (also known as its blinded key). In theseond round, a key-tree as shown in Figure 1 where eah leaf node represents a partiipant isonstruted using partiipant IDs or the value of the ontributions. The node in the bottom-most, left-most position in the tree is alled the sponsor. The sponsor node broadasts theset of blinded keys for all the intermediate nodes upto the root node. For the ase shownin Figure 1, the broadast message is {gr1, gr2 , gr3 , gr4 , ggr1r2 , ggr3.gr1r2 }. The group key is
K= gr4.gr3.gr1r2 . Partiipant Mi has to perform m − i exponentiations exept the sponsorwhih has to ompute 2m exponentiations. The protool laks a proof of seurity againstative adversaries.Thus both these protools are omputationally more expensive ompared to the protoolthat will be desribed in this paper.The ontributions of this paper are the following: an authentiated dynami group key agreement protool is realled [ABIS05℄, the mehanisms that must be used in a MANET to implement this group key agree-ment protool are desribed, a preise study of the ryptographi parameters that this group key agreement protoolmust use in the ontext of an ad ho network is arried out.
INRIA
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Figure 1: The STR ProtoolFinally the adapted version of the group key agreement protool that we propose, weall this protool AGDH for Asymetri Group Die Hellman, is among the very few groupkey agreement protools suitable for ad ho networks.The paper is organized as follows: Setion 3 realls the group key agreement protool. We desribe the basi funtioningof the protool only, Setion 4 explains how this group key agreement protool an be implemented in anad ho network. The main issues disussed in this setion inlude the eletion of aleader in the ad ho network and the ations that must be undertaken to handle splitsand mergers in the ad ho network, Setion 5 disusses the overhead of ryptographi operations.3 Presentation of AGDHWe reall an existing group key agreement protool in this setion. We rst illustrate thebasi priniple of key exhange, followed by a detailed explanation of how it is employedto derive Initial Key Agreement, Join/Merge and Delete/Partition proedures to handledynamism in ad ho groups.RR n° 5915
8 Adjih et al3.1 Notation
G: A subgroup (of prime order q with generator g) of some group.
Ui: ith partiipant amongst the n partiipants in the urrent session.
Ul: The urrent group leader (l ∈ {1, . . . , n}).
ri: A random number (from [1, q − 1]) generated by partiipant Ui. Also alled the seretfor Ui.
gri : The blinded seret for Ui.
grirl : The blinded response for Ui from Ul.
M: The set of indies of partiipants (from P) in the urrent session.
J : The set of indies of the joining partiipants.
D: The set of indies of the leaving partiipants.
x← y: x is assigned y.
x
r
← S: x is randomly drawn from the uniform distribution S.
Ui −→ Uj : {M}: Ui sends message M to partiipant Uj .
Ui
B
−→M : {M}: Ui broadasts message M to all partiipants indexed byM.
Ni: Random none generated by partiipant Ui.
VPKi{msgi, σi}: Signature veriation algorithm whih returns 1 if σi is a valid signatureon message msgi else 0.3.2 A Three Round Protool3.2.1 The formal desriptionPlease note that in the following rounds eah message is digitally signed by the sender (σjiis signature on message msgji in Tables 3- 5) and is veried (along with the nones) bythe reeiver before following the protool. Thus we omit to desribe these steps whih areformally shown in Tables 3- 5.Protool Steps:Round 1: The hosen group leader, Ml makes a initial request (INIT) with his identity,
Ul and a random none Nl to the groupM.Round 2: Eah interested Mi responds to the INIT request, with a IREPLY messagewhih ontains his identity Ui, a none Ni and a blinded seret gri to Ml (see Table 3 forexat message ontents).Round 3: Ml ollets all the reeived blinded serets, raises eah of them to its seret(rl) and broadasts them along with the original ontributions to the group, i.e. it sends anIGROUP message that ontains {Ui, Ni, gri, grirl} for all i ∈ M \ {l}.Key Calulation: Eah Mi heks if its ontribution is inluded orretly and obtains
grl by omputing (grirl)r−1i . The group key is
Key = grl ∗Πi∈M\{l}g
rirl = g
rl(1+
∑
i∈M\{l}
ri)
.Note:
INRIA
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l
r
←M, Nl
r
← {0, 1}k
Ul
B
−→M : {msg1l = { INIT , Ul, Nl}, σ1l }Round 2
∀i ∈M \ {l}, if(VPKl{msg
1
l , σl} == 1), ri r← [1, q − 1], Ni r← {0, 1}k,
Ui −→ Ul : {msgi = { IREPLY, Ul, Nl, Ui, Ni, gri}, σi}Round 3
rl
r
← [1, q − 1],
∀i ∈M \ {l}, if(VPKi{msgi, σi} == 1) and Nl is as ontributed
Ul
B
−→M : {msg2l = {IGROUP, Ul, Nl, {Ui, Ni, gri , grirl}i∈M\{l}}, σ2l }Key Computation
if(VPKl{msg
2
l , σ
2
l } == 1) and gri and Ni are as ontributed
Key = g
rl(1+
∑
i∈M\{l}
ri) Table 3: IKA1) The original ontributions gri are inluded in the last message as they are requiredfor key alulation in ase of group modiations (see below), and also, beause it may bepossible that a partiular ontribution has not been reeived by some member.2) Even though Πi∈M\{l}grirl is publily known, it is inluded in key omputation, toderive a key omposed of everyone's ontribution. This ensures that the key an not bepre-determined and is unique to this session.3) Even though the urrent group leader hooses his ontribution after others, he annotpre-determine the group key.The protool is formally dened in Table 3. Table 4 (respetively Table 5) show how theprotool is run when a group wants to join (respetively leave) an existing group3.2.2 Example runs of the protoolWe now see how this protool an be used to derive Initial Key Agreement (IKA), Join/Mergeand Delete/Partition proedures for ad ho networks.Initial Key Agreement Seure ad ho group formation proedures typially involve peerdisovery and onnetivity heks before a group key is derived. Thus, an INIT requestis issued by a partiipant and all interested peers respond. The responses are olletedand onnetivity heks are arried out to ensure that all partiipants an listen/broadastto the group (see for instane [RHH01℄). After the group membership is dened, GKAproedures are implemented to derive a group key. Suh an approah is quite a drain onthe limited resoures of ad ho network devies. Thus an approah whih integrates the twoseparate proedures of group formation and group key agreement is required. The aboveRR n° 5915
10 Adjih et alRound 1
∀i ∈ J , ri
r
← [1, q − 1], Ni
r
← {0, 1}k,
Ui
B
−→M : {msgi = { JOIN, Ui, Ni, gri}, σi}Round 2
∀i ∈ J , if(VPKi{msgi, σi} == 1) rl
r
← [1, q − 1], l′
r
←M∪J
Ul −→ Ul′ : {msgl = { JREPLY, {Ui, Ni, gri}∀i∈M∪J }, σl}Round 3
if(VPKi{msgl, σl} == 1), l← l
′, rl
r
← [1, q − 1],M←M∪J
Ul
B
−→M : {msg2l = { JGROUP, Ul, Nl, {Ui, Ni, gri, grirl}i∈M\{l}}, σ2l }Key Computation
if(VPKl{msg
2
l , σ
2
l } == 1) and gri and Ni are as ontributed
Key = g
rl(1+
∑
i∈M\{l}
ri) Table 4: Join/Mergeprotool ts well with this approah. Round 1 and Round 2 of the above protool an beinorporated into the group formation proedures. In this way, blinded serets, gri 's, of allpotential members, Ui's, are olleted before the group omposition is dened. When thefully onneted ad ho group is dened, a single broadast message (Round 3 in Table 3)from the group leader, Ul, (using ontributions of only the joining partiipants) helps everypartiipant to ompute the group key. An example is provided below.Suppose U1 initiates the group disovery and initially 5 partiipants express interest andsend gr2 , gr3 , gr4 , gr5 and gr6 respetively along with their identities and nones. Finallyonly 3 join beause of the full-onnetivity onstraint. Suppose the partiipants who nallyjoin are U2, U4 and U5. Then the group leader, U1, broadasts the following message: {gr2 ,
gr4 , gr5 , (gr2)r1 , (gr4)r1 , (gr5)r1}. On reeiving this message, eah partiipant an derive
gr1 using his respetive seret. Thus the key gr1(1+r2+r4+r5) an be omputed.Join/Merge Suppose new partiipants, U9 and U10 join the group of U1, U2, U4 and
U5 with their ontributions gr9 and gr10 respetively. Then the previous group leader (U1)hanges its seret to r′1 and sends gr′1 , gr2 , gr4 , gr5 , gr9 , gr10 to U10 (say the new group leader).
U10 generates a new seret r′10 and broadasts the following message to the group: {gr′1, gr2 ,
gr4 , gr5 , gr9 , gr′10r′1 , gr′10r2 , gr′10r4 , gr′10r5 , gr′10r9}. And the new key is gr′10(1+r′1+r2+r4+r5+r9).Delete/Partition When partiipants leave the group, they send a DEL message, thegroup leader hanges his seret ontribution and sends an IKA Round 3 like message to thegroup, omitting the leaving partiipants' ontributions. Refer to Table 5 and below for anexample.
INRIA
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∀i ∈ D, Ui −→ Ul : {msgi = { DEL, Ui, Ni}, σi}Round 2
∀i ∈ D, if(VPKi{msgi, σi} == 1), rl
r
← [1, q − 1],M←M\D
Ul
B
−→M : {msgl = { DGROUP, Ul, Nl, {Ui, Ni, gri , grirl}i∈M\{l}}, σl}Key Computation
if(VPKl{msgl, σl} == 1) and gri and Ni are as ontribute d
Key = g
rl(1+
∑
i∈M\{l}
ri)Table 5: Delete/PartitionSuppose a partiipant, U2, leaves the group of U1, U2, U4, U5, U9 and U10. Then theleader, U10 hanges its seret to r′′10 and broadasts {gr′1, gr4 , gr5 , gr9 , (gr′1)r′′10 , (gr4)r′′10 ,
(gr5)r
′′
10 , (gr9)r′′10} to the group. And the new key is gr′′10(1+r′1+r4+r5+r9).4 Using this GKA protool within an ad ho networkIn the following we are onsidering a multi-hop ad ho network. We are not assuming anypartiular property of the routing protool whih ensures the onnetivity of the network.We an use reative protools as AODV or DSR [PBRD03, JMH04℄ where the onnetivity isreated on demand when a route is needed. We an also use proative protools as OLSR orTBRPF [ACJ+03a, OTL04℄ where synhronous pakets are used to maintain the knowledgeof the topology. We will assume that we have a broadast mehanism to ood messageswithin the ad ho network. We are not assuming that this ooding mehanism is reliable,but we assume that the network is onneted and that ooding messages nally reahes allthe network nodes 1.A key point in the GKA protool desribed above is the existene of group leader. Thusit is neessary to have a robust mehanism to elet suh a leader in an ad ho network. Thatis the rst issue that we study.4.1 Eletion of a group leaderA key requirement is that all members of a group agree on the same group leader. A simplesolution is that the group leader periodially broadasts messages. These messages thenserve as a proof, for nodes that are within reah of the group leader, that a group leaderexists and operates properly. We an simply use the INIT message of GKA protool todemonstrate the existene and the orret funtioning of the group leader. When the other1We mean that synhronous ooded messages will nally reah all the network nodes even if there aremessages loossesRR n° 5915
12 Adjih et alnodes in the network reeive this INIT message eah replies with an IREPLY messageinluding their ontribution. Using these IREPLY messages, the group leader denes agroup and sends to all members of the group an IGROUP message. The INIT messagean be seen as an IGROUP message when the group is not yet dened. In the followingwe will only use the term IGROUP message.These IGROUP messages are sent periodially; depending on the dynamis of thegroup, the group leader will send a new IGROUP message or exatly the same message asbefore. If the network only omprises of the group leader, the latter will send periodiallyempty IGROUP messages. It will stop sending this message when a node joins its networkby replying to its IGROUP message with an IREPLY message. The mehanism to eleta group leader simply follows from the property that, in a network with a group leader,periodi messages are broadasted by the group leader and are, in priniple, reeived by thegroup members. If a node does not reeive a message for a xed period T, known a prioriby the network nodes, this node sets a random timer. At the expiration of this timer andif no IGROUP message has been reeived meanwhile, the node beomes the group leader.It then sends an empty IGROUP message.There may be a ollision on IGROUP messages if two nodes or more have seletedthe same value for their random timer. In suh a ase, there may be IGROUP messagesgenerated by two (or more) group leaders. To selet a group leader, we an use additionalrules. The rst rule is that when a group leader A reeives an IGROUP message from agroup leader B whih has a smaller ID than its own ID, the group leader A just stops to sendits periodi messages. The group members that will reeive periodi messages from morethan one group leader will only onsider the message issued by the group leader with thesmallest index. Thus if an IGROUP message showing a larger ID than a previously reeivedIGROUP message is reeived, then this message is simply disarded and no IREPLYmessage is issued. On the ontrary if an IGROUP message showing a smaller ID is reeivedthen the node issues a IREPLY message.Another issue is how the GKA protool takes into aount the dynamism of an ad honetwork. For instane a node may leave the network without being able to send the groupleader a message pointing out its departure from the network. This issue is handled in thenext subsetion4.2 Handling join and withdrawal of a nodeA node whih joins the network will reeive the periodi IGROUP message of the groupleader. He will just have to send a JREPLY message, with its ontribution, to join thegroup. The group leader will inorporate this new ontribution in its next IGROUP mes-sage. Atually there is no need in the protool to dierentiate between JREPLY andIREPLY. Thus, for simpliity sake, we will only keep the IREPLY message.In an ad ho network, the only oneivable way for the group leader to be sure that anode still belongs to a group is to reeive a message from it. Thus to handle the dynamismof a group, the group leader will use the periodi reeption of the IREPLY messages. Theperiod with whih an IREPLY message is sent by a member of the group should be theINRIA
AGDH 13same for all the nodes of the group. If the group leader is not reeiving a IREPLY messagefor a given number of periods (greater than 1 to handle possible paket loss), the lak ofreeption of these messages should be handled in the same way as the reeption of a DELmessage. In suh a ase the group leader will hange its own ontribution in the IGROUPmessage and will re-send the IGROUP message.When a node deliberately wishes to withdraw from a group it an use the DEL messageto announe this wish to the group leader. Upon the reeption of suh a message thegroup leader will hange its own ontribution in the IGROUP message and will re-send theIGROUP message. The use of the DEL message will speed up the taking into aount ofthe node withdrawal.4.3 Handling merge or split of groupsThe merger of groups (two or more) leads group leaders to reeive IGROUP messages fromother group leaders. The sheme used in the group leader eletion an be used to resolvethe onit. When the onit is resolved only one group leader is left in the group. If agroup splits, a part of the group will remain without group leader. The tehnique used inthe group leader eletion an be used in the subgroups without leader to elet a new leader.4.4 Renewing its ontributionThe group leader and group members will have to renew their ontribution periodially. Forthe group leader, the hange of its ontribution or of some member of the group will leadto a hange in the ontent of the IGROUP message. To simplify we an assume that thegroup leader and the group members hange their ontribution at the same rate.We have given all the priniples of the protool. We preise the details of the wholeprotool in the next setion.4.5 Implementation issuesWe will onsider a given period T . To simplify, this period will be used both by the groupleader or by the member of the group as a period to send their GKA messages.A node an be in one of the following two states : member state or group leaderstate. A node in a member state will enter the proess to beome a group leader if it has notreeived IGROUP message for a duration kT . A node whih has not reeived any messagefrom a group leader for a duration kT with k ≥ 2 will suppose that there is no group leaderand starts the proedure to beome a leader. Sine a node may not have reeived a paket ofthe group leader beause this paket has been lost, k must be seleted so that the probabilitythat k − 1 suessive transmissions of a GKA message are lost is small. Then, to beome agroup leader, the node selets a random integer ir between 1 and a given number l (bakowindow size) and initializes a timer at irtrtd, where trtd is a predened duration omputedto be at least the round trip delay of a message throughout the ad ho network. With suha gure for trtd we an be sure that if two nodes draw dierent integers ir and ir′, the nodeRR n° 5915
14 Adjih et alhaving seleted the larger integer will reeive the IGROUP message of the other node andthen will stop its eletion proess. The bako window size l must be hosen with respetto the total number of nodes in the network so that the probability that two nodes hoosethe same integer is small. This bak-o proedure is performed to avoid possibly multiplegroup leader andidates, for instane, when a group is set up or split into two subgroups.
Figure 2: Transition between the member and the leader stateWhen the node in the state member sends its rst IGROUP message, it is in the groupleader state, see Figure 2. In the group leader state, a node must ollet IREPLY messagesand form the related IGROUP message. When there is a hange in the group (arrival orwithdrawal) the group leader must hange its ontribution. Additionally, irrespetive of themodiation of the omposition of the group, the group leader must hange its ontributionperiodially, to maintain the seurity of the session key.When a group leader is eleted, the latter may hoose to wait additional periods beforesending a IGROUP ontaining the ontributions of the group members. Doing so, thegroup leader may avoid unneessary hanges to the session key due to the lak of reeipt ofall ontributions in time.In the group leader state, a node will also look out for IGROUP messages from anothergroup leader. If it reeives suh a message from another group leader holding a smaller nodeindex, the node hanges its state to the member state. In the member state, a node willhave to send IREPLY messages periodially. Like the group leader, a group member musthange its ontribution periodially with a period P see gure 3. We will assume that P isa large multiple of T . To simplify the proedure and to avoid unneessary omputations wean assume that the group leader does not instantly inlude a new ontribution of a groupmember in the IGROUP message, instead it will wait for the hange of its own ontributionINRIA
AGDH 15Parameter Value Constraint
P : key renew period 20 min
T : period ofIGROUP messages 5s
k: number of messages large enough to be sure thatlosses before assuming 3 the message is not simplya node leaves lost
l: bako window 20 large enough to avoid olli-sion during the group leadereletion
trtd: bako slot for more than a roundleader eletion 100 ms trip delayTable 6: Protool parametersto take into aount all new ontributions of nodes. This is possible sine the ontributionof the node member is inluded in the IGROUP message.
Figure 3: Sending IGROUP and IREPLY messagesBoth IGROUP and IREPLY messages must be sent periodially for eah interval T .To redue the probability of ollision of these messages, we add a jitter to times when theGKA messages shall be sent by the group members and the group leader.In the table 6, we have given examples of gures for our GKA protool. We an notiethat l and trtd will heavily depend of the number of nodes in the network and of the topologyof the network.
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16 Adjih et alGroup Size of ontributions blindings/seond=reoveries/seondModular Field 1024 bits 10Ellipti urve 160 bits 93Figure 4: Performane of ellipti urve ryptography, versus a lassial group (modularintegers)on a iPAQ, StrongARM-1110, using the openssl implementation, for a seuritylevel of 280. Blinding means omputing gri , and reovering means omputing gr0 from theblinded response grir0 of the leader .5 Computational overheadFigure 4 desribes the ost, on an average small devie (COMPAQ iPAQ), of ellipti urveryptography whih is more eient than lassial ryptographi relying on biger groups.Basially, for a seurity level of 280, suh a devie an perform almost 100 operations perseond. Thus the lateny of ellipti urve exponentiation is 10 mse per devie, exept forthe leader whose omputational ost grows linearly with the size of the group. Thus thereis onern for this partiular node. Assuming that the leader devotes half its times towardsryptogaphi operations, managing a group of size 50 will impose a delay of 1 seond beforebeing able to send the blinded response.The above omputational load on the group leader is in the ase where the group leaderreeives all the blinded serets at one, and has to give the blinded response also at one.In pratie, the group leader will reeive the blinded seret at dierent time slots. It is thenpossible to perform operations in bath: the group leader an generates its own seret inadvane, and ompute on the y the blinded reponses (gri)r0 upon reeption of eah blindedseret gri . He an also stepwise ompute the produt (gr1)r0 · · · (grm)r0 , where m is theindex of the last reeived ontribution. When he has to broadat the IGROUP message, allthe omputationaly intense ryptographial operations, neessary to generate the blindedresponses, have already been performed.6 ConlusionWe have disussed a group key agreement protool for handling ad ho group of small tomoderate size. We have fully speied the implementation details needed for atual use ofthe protool, relying on know network tehniques suh as self eletion, periodi broadast,bak-o tehniques. The protool is robust in the sense that onnetivity losses does notimpair its funtioning. We have experiened that the omputational ost of publi keyryptography is kept reasonably low. If we onsider onstraints in ad ho networks: nonetwork struture, high dynamism, restrited bandwidth the presented protool is amongthe few GKA protools whih is suitable for ad ho networks.
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